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Introduction
The controversies surrounding Heidegger’s involvement with National So-
cialism began soon after his early support of the movement and his implementa-
tion of its university politics as rector of the University of Freiburg. Adolf Hi-
tler was appointed German Chancellor on January 30, 1933 and Heidegger
officially joined the party onMay 1, 1933. Heidegger would only serve as rector
for one year, from April 21, 1933 to April 23, 1934. It was an eventful year in
which the National Socialist policy of Gleichschaltung (“coordination”), the
subordination of the educational system and all other dimensions of public and
private life to party power, was enacted across German society. Heidegger’s
engagement on behalf of National Socialism came as a surprise to his contem-
poraries, as Being and Time and his other writings and lecture-courses had not
been understood as supporting fascism. Criticisms of Heidegger’s thinking in
connection to his politics began in the surprised reaction of his students (e. g.
Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, and Herbert Marcuse) and young scholars who
had been inspired by his philosophy; most strikingly is the case of Emmanuel
Levinas who had enthusiastically embraced Heidegger’s thought after encoun-
tering it in 1929 and criticized the nexus between National Socialism and Hei-
deggerian ontology in “Some Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism”
(1934) andOf Escape (1935).2
The character and scope of Heidegger’s commitment to National Socialism
has been a reoccurring question since 1933: Günther Anders, György Lukács,
Theodor Adorno, and the young Jürgen Habermas, among others, confronted
the issue in the 1940s and 1950s; poststructuralist French thinkers such as Jac-
ques Derrida and Jean-François Lyotard engaged the question and its ramifica-
1 I would like to express my appreciation to François Raffoul and Richard Polt for their com-
ments on an earlier draft of this chapter. A previous shorter version of this chapter appeared as Eric 
S. Nelson, “Heidegger's Black Notebooks: National Socialism, Antisemitism, and the History of Being,” 
in François Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson, eds., The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger, expanded 
paperback edition (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 484-493. 
 
 
 
     2  Compare Richard Wolin, Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas,
      and Herbert Marcuse, Princeton 2003; Samuel Moyn, “Judaism against Paganism: Emmanuel
      Levinas’s Response to Heidegger and Nazism in the 1930s,” in: History and Memory (1998),
      25–58 and Michael Fagenblat, A Covenant of Creatures: Levinas’s Philosophy of Judaism,                 
      Stanford 2010, 70.
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tions in the 1980s and 1990s.3 The publication of the first four volumes of Hei-
degger’s so-called Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte; called black because of
their covers) has reignited smoldering questions concerning the potential
authoritarianism and antisemitism of the person and the thought.4 Although
Heidegger distinguished Nazism from fascism and claimed his remarks on the
Jews have nothing to do with antisemitism, his reflections remain troubling and
problematic.5 The currently published Notebooks consist of Überlegungen
(Considerations) II–XV (written from 1931 to 1941 and published in 2014 in
GAvolumes 94–96) and Anmerkungen (Notes) I–V (written from 1942 to 1948
and published in 2015 in GA 97).6
The extensive discussion of the Notebooks has primarily centered on a few
politically charged remarks; most of the content consists of philosophical reflec-
tions elaborating on themes found in other writings and lecture-courses from
the Nazi era. They neither develop an esoteric political philosophy nor a secret
National Socialist vision. Polemical accounts (notably, those of Emmanuel Faye
and Richard Wolin) have exaggerated the intrinsic and systematic character of
antisemitism and National Socialism operating throughout the entirety of his
philosophy.7 Apologetic tendencies have dismissed political questions as irrele-
vant to the task of philosophy, established a strict dualistic demarcation between
the thought and the person, or characterized questioning and criticism as a de-
nial of the right to read Heidegger. The fact of his commitment to an explicitly
totalitarian and racist government that systematically undermined the rights of
German citizens while he worked on the regime’s behalf and, after Heidegger’s
withdrawal from active political life, resulted in mass-persecution of minorities
and the mass production of human-made death is undeniable. The weight of this
fact is sufficient to justify critically questioning both the person and the philo-
sophy. National Socialism and the Holocaust are not negligible historical phe-
3 Jacques Derrida,Of Spirit: Heidegger and theQuestion, Chicago 1989; Jean-François Lyotard,
Heidegger and “the Jews” (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).
4 Questions raised in Karl Jaspers,Notizen zu Martin Heidegger, Munich 1978, 57–9.
5 See Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen VII–XI: Schwarze Hefte 1939/1939, hrsg. von Peter
Trawny (GA 95), Frankfurt am Main 2014, 408 and Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V;
Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948, hrsg. von Peter Trawny (GA 97), Frankfurt am Main 2015, 159.
Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen II–VI: Schwarze Hefte1931–1938, hrsg. von Peter Trawny
(GA94), Frankfurt amMain 2014. Martin Heidegger,Überlegungen XII–XV: Schwarze Hefte
1939–1941, hrsg. von Peter Trawny (GA 96), Frankfurt am Main 2014, 97
6 Richard Rojcewicz has titled his forthcoming translation “Ponderings” rather than “Consid-
erations”; Martin Heidegger, Ponderings II–VI: Black Notebooks 1931–1938 (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2016).
7 A typical example of the former tendency is the work of Emmanuel Faye; on the fairness and
accuracy of his account, which does not extend to Faye’s more recent treatment of the Black
Notebooks, see the powerful and insightful critique developed in Thomas Sheehan, “Emma-
nuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy?” Philosophy Today, 59.3 (Summer
2015): 367–400.
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nomena to be swept aside as undeserving and unworthy of thought. Heidegger’s
general silence and few casual remarks during the postwar are indications of a
deep—yet not necessarily “great” as Heidegger would later describe it—failure
of thinking to confront its finitude and facticity. If such events are not worthy of
thought, something has gone wrong with thinking and the defense of Heidegger
sacrifices too much and too many.
Is Heidegger’s philosophy then “contaminated”—to adopt a word used in
some discussions— by National Socialism and antisemitism? The question of
Heidegger’s involvement is not one of an external contamination but the inter-
nal structure and unthought of Heidegger’s thinking. It is not so much an issue
of whether works associated with the proper name “Heidegger” should or
should not be read; they will continue to be. The matter to be thought is how
they are interpreted as philosophical works that are bound up with the historical
life of a person that Heidegger himself would dismiss as merely biographical
and “historiological.” It is precisely such an interpretation, however, that the
“Heidegger case,” and his changing and at times contradictory self-narratives,
demands careful contextualization for the sake of philosophical and social-poli-
tical reflection.8
Heidegger’s ambivalence: The contexts of the Black Notebooks
How then might Heidegger be read in this politically charged context?
First, as Jean Grondin notes, the works should be read.9 As they are read, Hei-
degger emerges as a complex and ambivalent figure motivated by his perceived
failures and sense of crisis.10 Ambivalence is, however, found throughout the
reception of his thought, in which he has been read as both an opponent and
proponent of oppression, and in the sources that inspired this legacy. Heideg-
ger’s thinking promises an emancipation of ways of being in their multiplicity,
especially in the 1920s, and ways of being more experientially attuned and re-
sponsive to one’s world. Despite his thinking of radical difference, his thought
remains obsessed with the ultimate oneness of being (Sein) and a schematic and
8 An alternative conception of interpretation is called for that avoids the dualism between thin-
ker and thinking evident in Heidegger’s hermeneutics. I consider this point and examine Hei-
degger’s problematic relationship with biographical interpretation and self-narrative in Eric S.
Nelson, “What is Missing? The Incompleteness and Failure of Heidegger’s Being and Time,”
in: Lee Braver (ed.), Being and Time, Division III, Heidegger’s Unanswered Question of
Being, Cambridge, Mass. 2015, 197–218.
9 Jean Grondin, “The Critique and Rethinking of ‘Being and Time’ in the First Black Note-
books,” in: Ingo Farin and Jeff Malpas (eds.), Reading Heidegger’s Black Notebooks, Cam-
bridge, Mass. 2015.
10 Compare Peter Trawny, Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung, Frank-
furt am Main 32015, 17.
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fixated narrative of history that privileges the history of Occidental (abendlän-
disch) philosophy and ignores material, social-political, and non-Western his-
tories.11 Heidegger engages the radical historicity of the human condition while
formalizing history into a narrative about the fateful destiny of metaphysics
from Greece to Germany.
Heidegger is not a political theorist or thinker in any ordinary sense; he
never developed a political philosophy and his political comments reflect a pri-
marily anti-political attitude—which is itself an elitist form of the political, as
Habermas has argued concerning Heidegger and the German “mandarins.”12
Politically, mirroring his philosophical stance of the unity of being and the mul-
tiplicity of beings, Heidegger shows inclinations toward totalitarianism and
anarchism; politics is interpreted through the prism of the history of being and
this history relies on a language of destructuring and emancipation in the
“other” of history. Historically considered, Heidegger’s use of language is—as
Adorno has aptly described in The Jargon of Authenticity—fundamentally reac-
tionary, shaped by sentiments of nostalgia, home and homeland, and rural life.13
However, despite Heidegger’s own self-interpretation, scholars such as Reiner
Schürmann, John McCumber, and Peter Trawny have argued that Heidegger’s
thought has anarchistic and emancipatory tendencies that destabilize reified
conventional andmetaphysical concepts. Heidegger deployed a radical language
of philosophical contestation, revolution, and liberation that can have anarchis-
tic social-political implications, as it reveals the alterity of the past and present in
challenging the conformity and oppressiveness of the conventionally experi-
enced present.14
Heidegger’s initial support in 1933 and later elitist doubts concerning Na-
tional Socialism reveal a figure outside of the mainstream of National Socialist
11 On the parameters of Heidegger’s ethnocentrism, and his binary opposition of the Occidental/
Oriental, see Eric S. Nelson, “Heidegger, Misch, and the Origins of Philosophy,” Journal of
Chinese Philosophy, 39 (Supplemental Issue 2012), 10–30.
12 GA 97: 44–45 is an example of Heidegger’s global rejection of the category of the political.
Heidegger is, according to Habermas, “the very embodiment of the arrogant German mandar-
in par excellence.” Jürgen Habermas, Europe: The Faltering Project, Cambridge 2014, 3. Com-
pare his remark: “what was really offensive was the Nazi philosopher’s denial of moral and
political responsibility for the consequences of the mass criminality about which almost no
one talked any longer eight years after the end of the war. In the ensuing controversy, Heideg-
ger’s interpretation, in which he stylized fascism as a ‘destiny of Being’ that relieved indivi-
duals of personal culpability, was lost from view. He simply shrugged off his disastrous poli-
tical error as a mere reflex of a higher destiny that had ‘led him astray.’” Jürgen Habermas,
Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons,
2014), 20.
13 Theodor W. Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, Evanston 1973.
14 Reiner Schürmann,Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy, Bloomington
1990; John McCumber,Metaphysics and Oppression: Heidegger’s Challenge to Western Philo-
sophy, Bloomington 1999; Peter Trawny, Freedom to Fail: Heidegger’s Anarchy, New York
2015.
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politics and ideology while remaining in proximity and in its vicinity. It was
widely known by late 1934 in the German-speaking world that Heidegger was
“finished,” as he had fallen out of favor with the students, professors, and the
party.15 Despite his efforts as rector, Heidegger did not speak in the same way as
the National Socialist party philosophers and ideologues and his philosophy
could not be embraced by the National Socialist movement. Throughout the
Notebooks, it is obvious that Heidegger has an elitist “German mandarin” dis-
taste for numerous elements of the National Socialist movement: its vulgar po-
pulism, biological and pseudo-Darwinian racism, cultural and media politics,
and worship of technology and world-view thinking. He increasingly despises
its commitment to the primacy of “organization” and technology, and its use of
calculative planning in popular culture, propaganda, and racial eugenics. Central
elements of National Socialism are interpreted as symptoms of the crisis of
modernity that the movement, as “the confrontation of planetary technology
and modern humanity,” was supposed to contest and overcome.16 Heidegger’s
failure as rector in Freiburg, as well as his failed embrace of National Socialism,
is identified with the being-historical failure of National Socialism to realize its
inner promise and potential. National Socialism was in Heidegger’s estimation
an initially promising response to the nihilism of modernity; its being-historical
moment was missed, the opportunity for another beginning lost, and it revealed
itself as yet another insidious and derivative version of modernism along with its
primary forms that he designated Americanism, Bolshevism, and “Jewry” (Ju-
dentum).17 As his initial enthusiasm for National Socialism deteriorated, it is
increasingly perceived as a betrayal of the destiny of being and as fated to be
surpassed by its superior American and Soviet antagonists with which it is me-
taphysically the same.18
In the Notebooks, Heidegger’s commitment to National Socialism transi-
tions from initial enthusiasm to disappointment and suspicion. The Black Note-
15 Rudolf Carnap mentioned these developments in his diaries on three occasions in 1934–1935
(VII / 1934; 05. 09.1935; and 05.12.1935). Unpublished: Archives of Scientific Philosophy,
University of Pittsburgh, Carnap Papers (RC XXXX). Heidegger’s distancing himself from
politics in 1934 and subsequent critical remarks about National Socialism present a challenge
to the strong account of his involvement with National Socialism. One response, as Jaspers
argued in 1949, maintained that a disgruntled Heidegger began to reject the movement in
1934 because it rejected and sidelined him and there was never a decisive break (Jaspers,Noti-
zen zu Martin Heidegger, 58).
16 Jürgen Habermas, “Work and Weltanschauung: the Heidegger Controversy from a German
Perspective,” in: Critical Inquiry, 15:2 (Winter 1989), 452–454. On Heidegger’s increasing
alienation from National Socialism due to its failure to address the fundamental crisis tenden-
cies of modernity, compare Charles Bambach, Heidegger’s Roots: Nietzsche, National Social-
ism and the Greeks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 270.
17 Heidegger uses the German words Judentum (which can mean either Judaism or Jewry) and,
less frequently, Judenschaft.
18 See Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen XII–XV (GA 96), 243.
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books, like his other unpublished writings and lecture-courses, are full of critical
remarks about the movement and his times. Apologists will make good use of
these passages; yet they remain insufficient for a social-political critique of Na-
tional Socialism, which Heidegger never offered, and they can be disturbing in
their own ways, since Heidegger’s stance toward National Socialism is increas-
ingly “critical” only in a broadly right-wing and elitist manner. Heidegger still
maintained in the mid-1930s after his “withdrawal” from politics that National
Socialismmust still be “affirmed” even though it is not the radical new inception
he sought “from 1930 until 1934” (GA 95: 408).19 National Socialism must be
thoughtfully affirmed with necessity as the ultimate late-modern metaphysical
movement, at this point, and is not yet considered an “inferior” realization of
technological modernity in comparison with Western democracy and Eastern
communism as it will be portrayed in the later Notebooks.
Heidegger’s growing distance from the movement never encompassed po-
litical criticisms of the destruction of democracy, citizen rights, and human lives
that would be merely ontic and would for him reproduce the same paradigm of
modernity. There is likewise no departure from the centrality of the Occidental,
and Germany as the decisive land of the middle within the Occident. In contrast
to the poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin, which should be exemplary for the renew-
al of German existence, Heidegger came to believe that National Socialism
would ultimately prove to be too inadequate and weak for this challenge and,
in the end, must perish to superior forms of modernity. National Socialist Ger-
many had no historical responsibility or uniqueness for Heidegger; it merely
conformed to and reproduced Americanism, Bolshevism, and Jewry. This is
how Heidegger, in a menacing remark made between 1942 and 1945, can blame
Jewry, as the “principle of destruction” that helped unleash the paradigm of
technological modernity, for their own self-destruction.20 Heidegger’s proble-
matic remarks are ambiguous and in need of careful interpretation: are Heideg-
ger’s anti-Semitic remarks motivated by his anti-Christian polemic, which is a
much more central thread throughout theNotebooks, or vice versa? Is Jewry the
“principle of destruction” in a material sense or in the being-historical sense that
Marxism is construed by Heidegger as inverting and destroying the predomi-
nant form of modern metaphysics? Is Heidegger blaming the Jews for their own
physical self-destruction or maintaining that National Socialism is destroying
itself with the persecution of the Jews? In either case, whether he was com-
mitted to vulgar antisemitism or an ontological conception of the Jews, Heideg-
ger was unconcerned with the realities of Jewish suffering. In the fourth volume
19 Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen VII–XI (GA 95), 508.
20 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97), 20. For a careful and comprehensive account
of Heidegger and the Jews, see Donatella Di Cesare, Heidegger und die Juden, Frankfurt am
Main 2015.
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of the Black Notebooks, as in the previously published letter-exchange with his
former student Herbert Marcuse, Heidegger is concerned with German suffer-
ing at the hands of the Americans and Russians and expresses no concern for
victims of National Socialism.21 “Hitler,” who is apparently no worse than
Roosevelt or Stalin for Heidegger, does not name historical horror after the
end of the war. Hitler—Heidegger remarked in one postwar comment—is the
American excuse for the destruction of Europe.22
Vulgar and superior racism?
Heidegger repeatedly denied that he was antisemitic, and convinced his for-
mer student Hannah Arendt after their postwar meeting. As already noted, Hei-
degger made occasional antisemitic remarks and possibly engaged in antisemitic
actions when he was active on behalf of the movement in 1933/34; these include
his correspondence, possibly his activities against Jewish faculty enacting the
policy ofGleichschaltung (coordination) as rector of the University of Freiburg,
and the Black Notebooks and other writings from the 1930s and 1940s.23 Hei-
degger, for instance, commented in the 1933/4 seminar onNature, History, State
on “the nature of our German space” and the “Semitic nomads” for whom “it
will perhaps never be revealed at all.”24 TheNotebooks should not be a surprise
as other testimonials to his antisemitism and indifference to the fate of the Jews
have already appeared in print.25 They do provide further evidence and context
for Heidegger’s antisemitism. It might be argued that these remarks are rela-
tively few in number and Heidegger does not make antisemitism the center of
his thought in contrast to National Socialist racial ideologues. Probably this is
what Heidegger believes when he denied that he is an anti-Semite. Most of the
Black Notebooks concern his own philosophical thinking; his socialpolitical
complaints remain those of a philosopher who fails to engage the concrete struc-
tures and mechanisms of social-political life. Even if Heidegger did not engage
in public antisemitic polemics, which National Socialists were unafraid to
openly pursue, it does not remove the question. It also cannot be solely a ques-
tion of the quantity of statements. Heidegger’s “few” remarks are sufficiently
21 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97); “An Exchange of Letters, Herbert Marcuse
and Martin Heidegger,” ed. Richard Wolin, The Heidegger Controversy (Cambridge, The
MIT Press, 1993), 152–64.
22 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97), 250.
23 For example, there are a number of comments published in his correspondence with his wife:
“Mein liebes Seelchen!”. Briefe Martin Heideggers an seine Frau Elfride, 1915–1970, herausge-
geben und kommentiert von Gertrud Heidegger, München 2005.
24 Martin Heidegger, Nature, History, State: 1933–1934. Tr. and ed. Gregory Fried and Richard
Polt, London 2013, 56.
25 See Richard Wolin, ed., The Heidegger Controversy, Cambridge, Mass. 1993.
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disturbing. They may not express a biological, anthropological, or Social Dar-
winian racism given his long-standing rejection of racial thinking and dismissal
of the rhetoric of blood and soil. Nonetheless, Heidegger’s remarks concerning
Germans and Jews bear a family resemblance with radical Germanic thinking.
They belong to a German-centric, ethnocentric, and folkish (völkisch) way of
thinking; they evoke the Nazi idea of a world Jewish conspiracy; and they por-
tray Jews (including his own teacher Husserl) in stereotyped ways as calculative,
cunning, and criminal.26 He blames the European Jews for their own self-de-
struction and for creating the racism and totalitarianism that produced their
National Socialist versions.27
Perhaps these questionable remarks reflect a “merely” contingent or ontic
racism that can be distinguished from the ecstasy and height of Heidegger’s
philosophical endeavors.28 Perhaps, according to one line of interpretation, his
antisemitic remarks are contingent because of the very character of Heidegger’s
antisemitism. Heidegger can picture the Jews at most as one part of Western
modernity and as an accidental nonoccidental addition to the history of the
West that is decisively Greco-German for Heidegger. Heidegger cannot allow
a Jewish phase of Western metaphysics, as Jewry is outside of the Occident in its
inception and its destiny that will be decided by the Germans.29 Jews cannot
fundamentally define technological modernity, as Wolin and others have main-
tained, insofar as it is a phase of the history of being from which they are “out-
side” and excluded. Jewry can only reflect occidental history as the “principle of
destruction” such as the Marxist destructive reversal of German idealism.30 Hei-
degger maintained that Jewry cannot be creative and innovative, but only de-
structively enact possibilities given to them by Western, essentially Greek, me-
taphysics.31 Consequently, Jewish philosophers fromMaimonides to his teacher
Husserl cannot, on principle, occupy a significant role in Heidegger’s depiction
of the history of philosophy.32 Heidegger’s exclusion of Jews as outside and
other from the history of Western philosophy and originary thinking is behol-
26 See GA 96: 46–47, 56–57, 242–245, 262, 266; GA 97: 438; compare Trawny,Heidegger und der
Mythos, 87.
27 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97), 20, 438.
28 On the contrast between philosophical ecstasy and political catastrophe in Heidegger, see
David Farrell Krell, Ecstasy, Catastrophe: Heidegger from Being and Time to the Black Note-
books (Albany: SUNY Press, 2015).
29 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97), 20.
30 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97), 20. Heidegger elsewhere denied the Nazi
identification of Jewry and Marxism, at least in its “final form” (Martin Heidegger, Beiträge
zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), hrsg. von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (GA 65), Frank-
furt am Main 1989, 54.
31 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97), 20.
32 Heidegger probably considered earlier forms of Jewish philosophy as derivations of scholasti-
cism. Heidegger barely discussed Maimonides or Spinoza in his works. He remarked in 1936
that Spinoza’s philosophy is determined by Cartesianism and Scholasticism and cannot be
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den to an ontological rendition of ethnocentrism based in the being-historical
priority of Greece-Germany that is reiterated throughout his later works.
Heidegger’s few remarks concerning Jews and Jewry, given their relation to
the context of his thinking and his consistent avoidance and silence, are enough
to indicate that his antisemitism is not accidental or superficial.33 But given the
role of Jewry as one symptom of the history of metaphysics and modernity,
which is a consequence of the history of essentially Greek metaphysics, Heideg-
ger’s antisemitism is inconsistent with more radical antisemitic visions. Heideg-
ger to this extent should not be classified as a racial ideologue, as he rejected this
idea as calculative and reductive throughout the Notebooks. He repeatedly cri-
ticized racial theory and its anthropological and biologistic (i. e. modern meta-
physical) presuppositions throughout his lectures and writings of the 1930s and
1940s.34 He rejected the racial interpretation of “Volk” (the people) maintained
by National Socialism without, however, rejecting the notion of the culturally
essentialist vision of the unity, truth, and essence of the people (Volk).35 This
notion of Volk was articulated, after his initial enthusiasm for the National So-
cialist movement faded, in relation to the history of philosophy and the poetry
of Hölderlin.36 Accordingly, despite his rejection of racial thinking, as part of
the problematic of modernity, his thinking remains fundamentally ethnocentric;
it remains centered on a Greco-German axis that marginalizes and minimalizes
the multiplicity of philosophical perspectives. Heidegger maintained that his
thinking is nonsubject-oriented such that the Volk cannot be understood as a
collective subject that constitutes its world through its will and understanding,
much less through its anthropological, biological, and racial characteristics.
Nonetheless, the German people are an ontologically and being-historically
chosen people who are marked out by the history of being as the ones who pose,
decide, and renew the question of being.
Heidegger is committed to a German-centric vision of being from his em-
brace of National Socialism, as evident in the Rectorate speech, until the end of
equated with Jewish philosophy (Martin Heidegger, Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen
Freiheit [1809], hrsg. von Ingrid Schüßler [GA 42], Frankfurt am Main 1988, 115.
33 For a critical portrait of the potentially systematic character of Heidegger’s antisemitism, see
Trawny, Heidegger und der Mythos, especially 59–69. If “Bolshevism” and “Marxism” are
taken as code words for Judaism, as was frequently the case in Nazi Germany and is clearly
the case in some passages inHeidegger, such as Martin Heidegger,Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97),
20, then antisemitism is even more deeply ingrained in his thinking of the 1930s and 1940s.
34 Examples includeMartinHeidegger,Überlegungen II–VI (GA 94), 338, 475–476;Martin Hei-
degger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97), 12.
35 On Volk, see Martin Heidegger, Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache, hrsg. von
Günter Seubold (GA 38), Frankfurt am Main 1998, 65, and compare Trawny, Heidegger und
der Mythos, 27, 65.
36 For a careful study of Heidegger’s ideological context, and its divergence from ordinary Na-
tional Socialism, see Charles Bambach, Heidegger’s Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism and
the Greeks, Ithaca 2003.
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his life, as visible in the “Spiegel Interview” (1966) that repeats the same themes
developed in the 1930s and 1940s.37 Heidegger undoubtedly abandoned Na-
tional Socialism in some sense in his ownmind in the 1930s and 1940s and retro-
spectively justified his engagement for National Socialism as “failing greatly.”38
This is evident in his remarks about the movement in the Black Notebooks. Hei-
degger dismissed their vulgar racism and populism, their endorsement of tech-
nology and uses of popular culture and politics. He repeatedly expresses distaste
for their vulgarity and places National Socialism into the fallenness of the times
and the history of being culminating in technological modernity. Nonetheless,
Heidegger never questioned National Socialism in a specifically ethical or nor-
mative social-political manner. National Socialism failed Heidegger’s expecta-
tions for a decisive being-historical renewal of German Dasein and this was
Heidegger’s “failing greatly.” Heidegger failed to confront his own personal
and intellectual complicity in the postwar period, and his remarks from 1944
to 1948 (in GA 97) show his continuing defiance and resentment in the face of
the denazification campaign working against him.
Heidegger’s thinking is constitutively unable to respond to much less ana-
lyze basic elements of ethical life and social-political reality. There is no care for
ethical prophecy that confronts injustice; nor is there concern for the oblitera-
tion of democracy and human rights or the destruction of non-German life.39
After the war, he perceives in democracy a greater form of fascism.40 When Hei-
degger mourns war and its death and devastation, he expresses concern only for
German life and the only machinery of death mentioned is said to be aimed at
Germany.41 This exclusive focus continues in the postwar period. When Mar-
cuse asked Heidegger about the Holocaust, Heidegger could only respond by
countering with German deaths in the fire-bombing of Dresden and the Soviet
occupation of Eastern German territories.42
Heidegger would never confront his own philosophical-historical concep-
tions that led to his involvement and complicity with National Socialism. His
own collusion in this history is avoided and displaced into a narrative of the
history of being such that no discussion of the person Martin Heidegger is per-
mitted. There are no questions of personal individual responsibility and compli-
37 “Der Spiegel’s Interview with Martin Heidegger (1966),” in: Richard Wolin, The Heidegger
Controversy, 91–116.
38 This apologetic strategy is developed in the postwar Notebooks, see GA 97: 174–179; also
compare Trawny, Freedom to Fail.
39 Heidegger denounces the prophetic dimension (Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V
[GA 97], 159), the openness of the public sphere (GA 97: 146f.), ethical judgment and guilt
(ibid.) after the war, also in relation to Karl Jaspers.
40 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97), 249.
41 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97), 148.
42 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97); “An Exchange of Letters, Herbert Marcuse
and Martin Heidegger,” in: Richard Wolin (ed.), The Heidegger Controversy, 152–64.
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city; there are no considerations of repentance, forgiveness, or redemption in
Heidegger’s vision of being. This banal indifference and refusal toward others
is not “erring greatly”; it does not only reveal contingent flaws of personality
and character that should be dismissed to remain in pure philosophy. It dis-
closes, to speak in an Arendtian way, a fundamental thoughtlessness and inabil-
ity to think at the core of Heidegger’s thinking.
Further questions
There are a number of questions in need of further consideration.
The demarcation problem: both apologetic and polemic accounts of the
“Heidegger controversy” remain closed to the unavoidable and necessary ques-
tions that must continue to be posed and reposed anew. The philosophy and the
person cannot be as cleanly separated and demarcated as Heidegger thought or
as his most dedicated followers hope. At the same time, the thinking necessarily
outstrips the thinker and the philosophy calls for being encountered in its own
terms.
Heidegger’s questionable understanding of the biographical: Heidegger
provided inconsistent self-narratives about his own history and has a question-
able understanding of autobiography and biography in relation to philosophy.
He rejects the role of biographical interpretation in philosophy. Heidegger’s
thinking denies local contextual historical and biographical interpretations
(which are dismissed as historiographical history) for the sake of interpretation
from the history of being (history understood as ontological event); yet it is
precisely the former that the “Heidegger case,” and his changing at times con-
tradictory self-narratives, demands—careful contextualization for the sake of
philosophical and social-political reflection. For Heidegger, it is the history of
being and not Heidegger himself that is at stake. Yet the complexities and com-
plicities of his own life and thinking call for such a hermeneutics.
Heidegger’s questionable understanding of ethics and politics: Heidegger’s
“failures” are more than a failure of a person; his philosophy is permeated by
structural deficits that need to be addressed at the level of philosophy. There is
no thinking of rights of individuals or minorities; there is no concern or care for
the suffering of non-German others; democracy and self-organization are re-
ductively taken to be only instruments of organizational planning and techno-
logical modernity. His fundamental critique of modernity concerns technology
and is addressed through poetry. Ethical-political ideas such as justice, fairness,
and equality, and structural problems of capital and bureaucratic power are ig-
nored. All these are necessary for an adequate conception of politics that would
challenge the types of power Heidegger leaves unquestioned.
Heidegger’s questionable quasi-teleological conception of history stems
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from Greece and culminates in the German encounter with modernity. Heideg-
ger’s conception of occidental history centers on the special ontological and
philosophical rank and uniqueness of Germany. This vision is not identical to
that of National Socialism and Heidegger uses it to challenge elements of Na-
tional Socialism. Still, Heidegger’s philosophy of history has its own question-
able agenda. The idea of history that led to his engagement for and complicity
with National Socialism still shape and are at work in his later thinking.
Conclusion
Heidegger wishes to construct a world that can greet and embrace the earth
and allow it to flourish and humans to dwell in a more thankful, responsive, and
attentive way.43 Such aspects of Heidegger’s writing, which are developed
throughout the Notebooks in intriguing ways, continue to resonate and suggest
why Heidegger will be continued to be read even as his more sinister thoughts
are rightfully criticized and rejected. Heidegger’s thinking of history has inter-
ruptive and an-archic impulses that can help motivate an encounter with history
as event, as suggested earlier; it, nonetheless, is a vision of history without per-
sons and without recognition of genuine suffering.44 Heidegger’s philosophy
remains a touchstone for reflection even as its ethnocentric and depersonalizing
tendencies deserve publicity and critical reflection.
43 Compare Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97), 3.
44 On Heidegger’s conceptions of historicity and history, see Eric S. Nelson, “Questioning Prac-
tice: Heidegger, Historicity and the Hermeneutics of Facticity,“in: Philosophy Today 44
(2001), 150–159; Eric S. Nelson, “History as Decision and Event in Heidegger,” in: Arhe, IV:
8 (2007), 97–115; Eric S. Nelson, “Heidegger, Levinas, and the Other of History.” John Dra-
binski and E. S. Nelson, ed., Between Levinas and Heidegger, Albany 2014, 51–72.
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